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THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION AS LAW  
AND THE LEGITIMACY OF THE SUPREME 
COURT’S CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS:  




It is notorious in the area of Japanese legal studies that the Supreme 
Court of Japan has held legislation to be unconstitutional in only a handful 
of cases since the Constitution was promulgated in 1947.1 This feature of 
its jurisprudence is viewed as being rather remarkable when compared to 
the records of the high courts in other liberal democracies, and in light of 
the relatively robust array of individual rights enshrined in the 
Constitution of Japan. It has been the subject of much scholarly analysis 
and criticism. In his Article Why is the Japanese Supreme Court so 
Conservative?, Professor Shigenori Matsui explores the many arguments 
that have been advanced over time to explain this aspect of Japanese 
constitutional law, which Matsui calls the Court‘s ―conservative 
jurisprudence.‖2 Many of these arguments are not new, of course, but his 
compilation and summary of the analysis is nonetheless very helpful.3 
 
 
  Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. This Article was 
written for the Japanese Supreme Court Symposium held at the Washington University in St. Louis 
School of Law in September 2010. As the title suggests, it was written as a short response to an Article 
presented at the symposium by Professor Shinegori Matsui of the University of British Columbia 
Faculty of Law. I would like to thank first and foremost John Haley and David Law for the invitation 
to be part of this important symposium, and Shinegori Matsui for the opportunity to comment on his 
Article. I would also like to thank Tom Ginsburg, Larry Repeta, Kermit Roosevelt, and Frank Upham 
for very helpful comments and thoughts on early drafts of this Article. I am, of course, responsible for 
any errors. (It should be noted that the names of Japanese authors of Japanese language sources are 
rendered in the Japanese style of surname first, while the names of Japanese authors of English 
language sources are rendered in the normal English format). 
 1. Technically, the Constitution of 1947 constituted an amendment of the 1898 Constitution of 
the Empire of Japan, commonly known as the Meiji Constitution, though in reality it was an entirely 
new constitution. On the history of the process of ―amendment‖ and promulgation, see RAY A. MOORE 
& DONALD L. ROBINSON, PARTNERS FOR DEMOCRACY: CRAFTING THE NEW JAPANESE STATE UNDER 
MACARTHUR (2002) [hereinafter MOORE, PARTNERS] and KOSEKI SHŌICHI, THE BIRTH OF JAPAN‘S 
POSTWAR CONSTITUTION (Ray A. Moore ed. & trans., 1997). 
 2. Shigenori Matsui, Why is the Japanese Supreme Court So Conservative?, 88 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1375 (2011) [hereinafter Matsui, Japanese Supreme Court]. 
 3. See, e.g., HIROYUKI HATA & GO NAKAGAWA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF JAPAN 78 (1997); J. 
MARK RAMSEYER & ERIC B. RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF JUDGING IN JAPAN (2003) [hereinafter RAMSEYER, MEASURING JUDICIAL 












Within this review, however, Matsui advances a new argument and 
isolates it as being one of the most important explanations for the Court‘s 
reluctance to strike down legislation as unconstitutional—that the judges 
of the Supreme Court tend not to understand the Constitution as being a 
source of positive law that requires enforcement by the judiciary.4 He 
argues that most of the judges view the Constitution with some distrust 
and suspicion, and understand it to be more of an articulation of political 
and moral principles than a source of law.5  
This argument makes an important contribution to the literature on the 
Supreme Court‘s apparent conservatism, passivity, weakness, or timidity, 
depending on how one explains its reluctance to enforce the Constitution. 
It offers up a very different kind of explanation than most of the other 
claims about the Court‘s conduct. Rather than being an account based on 
reasons that are primarily political, institutional, or cultural, it is very 
much a critique grounded in the judges‘ approaches to and employment of 
legal principles. It is an argument that examines the conduct of the court as 
such, assessing it on the basis of how it applies and interprets its decisions 
as a legal institution, rather than analyzing the court as simply one of 
several political institutions vying for power and authority within a 
competitive political system.  
 
 
INDEPENDENCE]; Malcolm M. Feeley, The Bench, the Bar, and the State: Judicial Independence in 
Japan and the United States, in THE JAPANESE ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN CONTEXT 67, 79–83 (Malcolm 
M. Feeley & Setsuo Miyazawa eds., 2002); John O. Haley, The Japanese Judiciary: Maintaining 
Integrity, Autonomy, and the Public Trust, in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 99 (Daniel H. Foote 
ed., 2007) [hereinafter Haley, Judiciary]; David S. Law, The Anatomy of a Conservative Court: 
Judicial Review in Japan, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1545 (2009) [hereinafter Law, Conservative Court]; Percy 
R. Luney, Jr., The Judiciary: Its Organization and Status in the Parliamentary System, in JAPANESE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 123, 145 (Percy R. Luney, Jr. & K. Takahashi eds., 1993); Setsuo Miyazawa, 
Administrative Control of Japanese Judges, in JAPANESE LAW IN CONTEXT: READINGS IN SOCIETY, 
THE ECONOMY, AND POLITICS 103 (Curtis J. Milhaupt, J. Mark Ramseyer & Michael K. Young eds., 
2001); J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Judicial Independence in a Civil Law Regime: The 
Evidence from Japan, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 259 (1997) [hereinafter Ramseyer, Judicial 
Independence]; Frank K. Upham, Political Lackeys or Faithful Public Servants? Two Views of the 
Japanese Judiciary, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 421 (2005) [hereinafter Upham, Political Lackeys]. See 
generally JOHN OWEN HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW (1998); HIGUCHI YOICHI, KENPŌ 
HANREI O YOMINAOSU [RE-READING CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEDENTS] (2d ed. 1999); HIROSHI ITOH, 
THE JAPANESE SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL POLICIES (1989); ASHIBE NOBUYOSHI, KENPŌ 
SOSHŌ NO RIRON [THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION] (1973); FUJII TOSHIO, SHIHŌKEN TO 
KENPŌ SOSHŌ [JUDICIAL POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION] (2007); FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW 
AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN (1987) [hereinafter UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE]; 
Hidenori Tomatsu, Judicial Review in Japan: An Overview of Efforts to Introduce U.S. Theories, in 
FIVE DECADES OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN JAPANESE SOCIETY 251, 251–77 (Yoichi Higuchi ed., 
2001).  
 4. Matsui, Japanese Supreme Court, supra note 2. 













As a primary explanation for the Court‘s conduct, this argument is both 
new and potentially important. And in this short response to Professor 
Matsui‘s Article, I would like to suggest that the significance of his central 
argument can be further highlighted by reframing his central question and 
thereby shifting slightly the focus of the inquiry. It should be understood 
that there is, after all, a normative component to Matsui‘s argument. He 
not only asks why the Court is so conservative, and answers that it is so 
because the judges do not sufficiently respect the Constitution as law, but 
he is also implicitly arguing that such failure to understand the 
Constitution as law is wrong, and that the reluctance of the Court to 
enforce the rights in the Constitution is improper. It is ultimately a 
normative argument aimed at changing the way the Court decides 
constitutional cases. 
While I think that Professor Matsui‘s explanation is important and 
powerful, I want to suggest that reframing the question, and thus the 
nature of the argument, can help to strengthen his claim regarding the 
Court‘s understanding of the Constitution. Perhaps more importantly, such 
shifting of the focus can help to create a more powerful set of arguments 
aimed at creating pressure for change. In short, rather than ask why the 
Court is so conservative, I would suggest that we ask whether the Court‘s 
constitutional decisions are legitimate. For reasons that I will explore in 
Part II, it may be somewhat misleading to characterize the Court and its 
conduct as being ―conservative,‖ just as it is not that helpful to debate the 
level of a court‘s alleged ―activism.‖6 In the debate on the appropriate role 
of courts in the United States, it has been argued that it is more fruitful to 
consider the extent to which the court‘s judgments are legitimate, based on 
clearly articulated criteria for legitimacy, rather than engage in discussion 
about the extent to which courts are ―activist.‖7 Similarly, to ask whether 
the Supreme Court of Japan‘s decisions are legitimate is to turn the focus 
from making inferences about the operation of forces external to the Court, 
the nature of the Court as an institution, or the character or ideology of its 
judges as people, to the manner in which the judges actually reach their 
decisions and explain their judgments. And reshaping the question in this 
way brings into much starker relief the significance of Matsui‘s argument 
regarding the failure of the judges to take seriously the Constitution as a 
source of positive law. 
 
 
 6. As discussed below, this argument that it is more meaningful to focus on legitimacy rather 
than judicial activism is from KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: MAKING 
SENSE OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS (2006). 
 7. Id. 












In Part III of this Article, I will review briefly two different approaches 
to analyzing the legitimacy of a court‘s decision-making process in cases 
involving fundamental constitutional rights, based on two different but 
well-established theories of rights and judicial review. The first is 
grounded in a theory of substantive rights and the application of the 
proportionality principle in the judicial review of fundamental 
constitutional rights, while the second is a process theory approach to 
assessing legitimacy. Under both approaches, it is accepted that there is no 
one definitively correct answer to any given constitutional issue, but it is 
claimed that there are nonetheless criteria against which we can assess 
whether a decision falls within a reasonable range of legitimate responses. 
Or, to put it another way, any particular decision can be analyzed for the 
purpose of determining whether the reasoning and ultimate result of the 
court‘s decision is sufficiently consistent with the theoretical principles 
that inform our understanding of rights and the function of constitutional 
judicial review.  
The suggestion is that a systematic analysis of the decisions of the 
Supreme Court of Japan in constitutional rights cases, in accordance with 
either of these approaches, may reveal that a significant percentage of the 
Court‘s judgments are lacking in legitimacy. This short Article is not the 
place for such a comprehensive analysis, of course, but in Part IV of the 
Article, I examine one recent equality rights decision of the Supreme 
Court, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government case, and illustrate how such 
an assessment of a judgment‘s legitimacy might be conducted. The 
exercise suggests that both the reasoning and the result of the Court‘s 
judgment quite clearly fail to meet the legitimacy requirements under 
either the proportionality or the process theory approach. Moreover, the 
reasons provide quite explicit evidence that some of the judges understand 
the individual rights in the Constitution as being something other than 
positive law to be enforced by the courts. 
The point is not, of course, that all of the Court‘s constitutional 
jurisprudence is illegitimate. The Court has in fact recently handed down 
decisions in the equality rights context that suggest that it may be 
developing a more sophisticated, and ultimately more legitimate, approach 
to constitutional rights cases.8 But if a significant number of constitutional 
 
 
 8. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 4, 2008, 62 SAIKō SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
1367, available in English at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2008.06.04-2006.-Gyo-
Tsu-.No..135-111255.html. For a detailed analysis of the case, and the extent to which it represents the 













cases can indeed be shown to lack legitimacy, and more particularly one 
can show precisely how they lack legitimacy, it could provide powerful 
evidence in support of Professor Matsui‘s claim that many of the judges 
simply do not accept the Constitution as positive law. More importantly, 
because Matsui‘s claim is one that essentially focuses on how the Court 
understands and employs legal principles, an approach that redirects the 
inquiry more specifically toward how the Court decides cases, rather than 
focusing on the nature of the results, may be more effective as a normative 
argument for change. In particular, reformulating the inquiry in this way 
will likely lead to a much more powerful and detailed criticism of how the 
judges conduct themselves in the decision-making process. If one accepts 
the proposition that how the judges apply legal principles and develop 
doctrine matters, as Matsui‘s claim clearly does, refocusing the analysis on 
the illegitimacy of the decision-making process is more likely to advance 
the normative aspect of his argument and create greater pressure for 
effective change. 
II. CONSERVATISM OR LEGITIMACY? 
A. Problems with the Conservative Label  
Professor Matsui is certainly not alone in arguing that the Japanese 
Supreme Court is conservative, and that it is excessively so. But what, 
precisely, is meant by saying the Court is conservative? I would suggest 
that the term, used in the context of an analysis of the court‘s decision 
making, suffers from an ambiguity that tends to blunt the power and 
significance of Matsui‘s central argument. The ambiguity begins with the 
fact that the term conservative, even when applied to the jurisprudence and 
conduct of a particular court, has several distinct and quite different 
meanings. In criticism of the Supreme Court of Japan, it tends to be used 
primarily to mean that the Court is overly deferential to the government 
and the Diet in its decision making, in refusing to strike down legislation 
and invalidate government action for being in violation of the 
Constitution. In this sense, conservative is the polar opposite of ―activist,‖ 
a term frequently employed to criticize courts for being insufficiently 
deferential to the democratically elected branches of government and 
engaging, so the argument goes, in the ―making of law‖ as opposed to the 
 
 
Equality Rights Doctrine in Japanese Courts from a Comparative Perspective, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT‘L L. 167 [hereinafter Martin, Glimmers of Hope]. 












mere interpretation and application of the law.9 But even within the 
context of this activist-conservative spectrum, the term conservative can 
have different facets, sometimes meaning deferential to the government 
and legislature, while at other times meaning minimalist and parsimonious 
in a court‘s approach to interpretation of law, particularly the Constitution, 
and in its development of doctrine. These two meanings can often overlap 
to a considerable degree, but they can also diverge in important ways, with 
courts sometimes being quite ―activist‖ in their development of new 
doctrine in the cause of deference to the political branches of government, 
and at other times being minimalist in their approach to interpretation in 
the process of striking down new government initiatives. 
In arguing that the Supreme Court of Japan is conservative, however, it 
is also sometimes meant that the Court is taking positions and making 
judgments that reflect and implement conservative ideology. This is 
certainly a significant component of the criticism of the Court for its 
failure to enforce the individual rights enshrined in the Constitution.10 In 
this respect, the term conservative is used in contrast to a ―liberal‖ or 
―progressive‖ approach to rights enforcement and constitutional 
interpretation. The two meanings of conservative tend to be easily elided 
in the Japanese context, since the government has itself been characterized 
as being conservative for virtually all of the Court‘s existence, and thus 
determining whether the motive behind the Court‘s jurisprudence was 
primarily one of deference to the government or the ideologically 
motivated implementation of conservative policy would be rather 
difficult.11 But the fact remains that courts generally can and do engage in 
decision making that cuts across these spectra, making decisions that, 
 
 
 9. ROOSEVELT, supra note 6, at 12–16. For examples of such criticism of courts for activism, 
see generally MARK R. LEVIN, MEN IN BLACK: HOW THE SUPREME COURT IS DESTROYING AMERICA 
(2005). 
 10. See, e.g., ITOH, supra note 3, at ch. 6. For analysis of constitutional law and the Supreme 
Court‘s approach to the Constitution, see generally SHIGENORI MATSUI, NIHONKOKU KENPŌ 
[JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] (2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter MATSUI, KENPŌ]; ASHIBE NOBUYOSHI, 
KENPŌ [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] (3d ed. 1997); ASHIBE NOBUYOSHI, KENPŌ HANREI O YOMU 
[READING CONSTITUTIONAL CASES] (1987); ASHIBE NOBUYOSHI, KENPŌ SOSHŌ NO RIRON [THEORY 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION] (1973); URABE NORIHO, KENPŌGAKU KYŌSHITSU [COURSE ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] (1988); FUJII, supra note 3.  
 11. There is, of course, important scholarship demonstrating that at least on certain issues 
deemed to be important to the government of the Liberal Democratic Party, the lower courts in Japan 
have been responsive to structural pressure to decide cases in conformity with government policy 
preferences. Law, Conservative Court, supra note 3 (noting that institutional characteristics of the 
Supreme Court make it vulnerable to government pressure); Ramseyer, Judicial Independence, supra 
note 3 (providing empirical analysis demonstrating the adverse career consequences for deciding cases 













according to the definitions frequently employed by their critics, are both 
aggressively activist and ideologically conservative on the one hand, or on 
the other hand, deferential and minimalist in approach but with 
significantly liberal outcomes. 12 
This argument should not be pressed too far—obviously the term 
conservative has definite meaning in political terms, and to the extent that 
the Court is being considered as one of several political institutions locked 
in competition, describing it as conservative may be both coherent and 
meaningful.13 The problem I am focusing on here is the widespread 
practice of describing the Court‘s decision making and jurisprudence as 
being conservative, which is less coherent. And that is important, unless 
we reject the notion that the Court operates as a legal institution that 
makes decision in accordance with legal principles, and we instead 
embrace the argument that the Court is a purely political institution that 
operates solely according to political imperatives. And quite aside from 
the lawyer‘s normal proclivity to consider courts as having some validity 
and legitimacy as legal institutions, which primarily operate according to 
legal imperatives for the purposes of giving effect to principles of law, the 
fact remains that empirical analysis supports the proposition that the 
Japanese courts in particular demonstrate a considerable degree of 
independence and professional integrity.14 
The problem of describing the Court‘s decision making as conservative 
is important, therefore, because in addition to the potential confusion in 
what is precisely meant by the term ―conservative‖ as discussed above, 
 
 
 12. Several recent cases in the United States illustrate this point. In the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals decision in Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010), the court 
dismissed the claim of Binyam Mohamad and several other applicants who sought damages and other 
remedies under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (enacted as part of the Judiciary 
Act of 1789), for the harm caused to them resulting from their ―extraordinary rendition‖ by the CIA to 
foreign countries for the purpose of interrogation employing torture. The court, sitting en banc, 
overturned a decision of a panel of three of its justices, based on an expansive formulation of the State 
Secrets Doctrine. It has been argued that the court‘s expansion of the scope and application of the 
doctrine was particularly aggressive, because the privilege was developed to exclude specific pieces of 
evidence, rather than as a doctrine justifying the dismissal of an entire case. For analysis of the 
evolution of the doctrine, see Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 77 
(2010) and Steven D. Schwinn, The State Secrets Privilege in the Post-9/11 Era, 30 PACE L. REV. 770 
(2010). The decision can be said, in this sense, to bear the hallmarks of ―activist‖ decision making by 
expanding a doctrine into new territory with little underlying textual or other authority. But at the same 
time, the judgment could be said to be deeply conservative in its deference to the government, and 
moreover in its ideological position on where to draw the line between individual rights and national 
security imperatives. 
 13. My thanks to Frank Upham for emphasizing the importance of this distinction. 
 14. See generally, e.g., Haley, Judiciary, supra note 3; Ramseyer, Judicial Independence, supra 
note 3; Upham, Political Lackeys, supra note 3. 












there is the argument that the term does not have any real meaning as a 
tool for legal analysis. In this sense, the term ―conservative‖ has no more 
meaning than ―activist.‖ To say that a court or a specific judge was activist 
or conservative in any particular decision is to really only suggest that one 
disagrees with the result, and moreover, that the judgment not only 
represents an obvious error but was essentially dishonest in some way. It 
implies that the judge or panel of judges ignored some plain meaning of 
the Constitution and reached a result with which the speaker profoundly 
disagrees for ideological reasons.15 In the rhetoric of ―judicial activism,‖ 
this is framed in terms of the court having departed from the text and 
established meaning of the Constitution to impose its own philosophical 
values. In the discussion of ―judicial conservatism,‖ it is expressed as the 
Court‘s excessive deference to the political branches of government, 
abdication of judicial responsibility to enforce the constitutional rights and 
obligations, and, sometimes, the imposition of its own conservative 
ideological views in the process of denying the rights of others. 
Kermit Roosevelt has argued in the American context that rather than 
engage in debate over judicial activism, it is more helpful and meaningful 
to discuss the legitimacy of a court‘s decision making.16 The same 
argument can be applied to the issue of judicial conservatism. And in the 
context of Japan, analyzing the legitimacy of the Supreme Court‘s 
decisions and its decision-making process may lead to far more concrete 
criticism of the manner in which the judges of the Supreme Court 
understand the Constitution and develop doctrine for its enforcement. It is 
precisely in such an analysis that Matsui‘s central argument, that the Court 
fails to understand the Constitution as positive law that commands 
obedience and judicial enforcement, becomes so important. 
In the final analysis, the accusation that the Supreme Court of Japan is 
excessively conservative is based in large measure on the Court‘s low rate 
of striking down laws and regulations as being constitutionally invalid. As 
Professor Haley points out in his Article for this conference, low rates of 
invalidating laws do not ultimately tell us very much17—they could merely 
mean that the Diet is better at drafting laws that comply with the 
Constitution than legislatures in other countries, and that the government 
is more compliant with the Constitution in its policy making. It is precisely 
because we think that many cases were in fact wrongly decided, and that 
 
 
 15. ROOSEVELT, supra note 6, at 39. 
 16. See generally id. at 1–64. 
 17. John O. Haley, Constitutional Adjudication in Japan: Context, Structures, and Values, 88 













the government has not been as compliant as the jurisprudence would 
suggest, that we think something is wrong. But demonstrating precisely 
how a significant number of decisions might be of doubtful legitimacy, 
and illustrating how the doctrine employed by the Court is inconsistent 
with well-established approaches to rights enforcement, may be a more 
meaningful criticism than simply arguing that the court is excessively 
conservative. 
III. TWO APPROACHES TO ASSESSING LEGITIMACY 
We turn next to the question of what exactly we mean by legitimacy 
and how one might assess the legitimacy of judicial decisions as an 
alternative to categorizing them as either too conservative or excessively 
activist. The idea is to analyze the decisions within the framework of 
accepted theories of rights, constitutional interpretation, and judicial 
review; to assess whether the reasons for the decision can be justified in 
terms of such theories; and to determine whether the ultimate conclusion 
falls within a reasonable range of possible decisions in the circumstances 
of the case.  
What exactly is meant by the term ―legitimacy,‖ and how is it any more 
precise or substantive than either the activist or conservative labels? The 
key distinction is that the inquiry into legitimacy focuses on the nature of 
the decision-making process, assessing the analytical approach employed 
by the Court against a set of criteria that flow from well-established 
theoretical approaches to constitutional interpretation, rights, and judicial 
review. In contrast, arguments about activism and conservatism tend to 
concentrate on the results—whether the Court has upheld or struck down 
legislation—and the motivation or ideological agenda that is imputed to 
the judges on the basis of those results. While the rhetoric surrounding 
both judicial activism and conservatism tends to both assume and imply 
that there is one correct and clear answer to most constitutional questions, 
the idea of legitimacy is grounded in the notion that there is a range of 
possible reasonable decisions to complex constitutional questions, all of 
which may be legitimate, so long as the doctrine developed and the 
analytical approach used can be justified by reference to well established 
theory.18  
Again, it is important to emphasize that the discussion of legitimacy 
here relates to the soundness of the decision-making process of the Court 
 
 
 18. Id. at 16, 20, 43–44.  












in legal terms, rather than addressing the status or authority of the Court as 
a political actor—though, as I will return to below, these are not entirely 
unrelated factors. To the extent that the decision-making process is 
illegitimate in legal terms—and it is increasingly perceived to be so by 
lawyers, legal scholars, and even lower court judges—then the authority 
and power of the Court as a political institution is likely to suffer.  
There are, of course, several different and competing theories of 
constitutional interpretation and rights analysis, and which one in 
particular should be selected as the basis for assessing the legitimacy of 
the Court‘s decisions could itself be the subject of very heated debate.19 
But this short Article is intended to be merely the beginning of a 
discussion on the matter and so is not the place to canvass the field or 
explore that debate.20 Instead, for purposes of illustrating how legitimacy 
might be assessed, I select here two very different approaches from among 
a handful of dominant contenders, being the proportionality principle 
approach, and the process theory approach to judicial review.21 As I will 
illustrate in Part IV, some decisions of the Court will in any event fail the 
test under either of these approaches. 
 
 
 19. Some of these relate more to constitutional interpretation than to theories of rights or the 
rationale for judicial review, though interpretation will obviously affect the approach to judicial 
review—but generally, I am referring here to the moral theory or substantive rights approach to 
interpretation and judicial review, which is most closely associated with Ronald Dworkin; the process 
theory of rights and judicial review advanced by John Hart Ely; the originalist approaches of 
constitutional interpretation, often associated with Robert Bork and Justice Antonin Scalia; and the 
theory of judicial review of constitutional rights encompassed in the proportionality principle model 
that is championed by David Beatty. See DAVID M. BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW (2004); 
RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM‘S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 
(1996); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); 
Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).  
 20. It should be acknowledged here that it is possible that any given decision may fall within this 
range of legitimacy when analyzed in accordance with one theory or analytical approach, but fail to do 
so under a competing approach. There are, without question, ongoing debates regarding these 
competing theoretical approaches, but this does not detract from the argument that in general terms, 
assessing the legitimacy of the reasons for judgment of a court according to some well-established 
theory is more meaningful and helpful than criticizing the final result as being either conservative or 
activist. 
 21. David Beatty, in a short review of several of these approaches, argues that the proportionality 
principle model is not only superior for a number of reasons, but is in fact the most widely applied in 
the constitutional courts of the democratic world. Process theory is primarily limited to the United 
States. See BEATTY, supra note 19, at ch. 1 for the comparative review, and ch. 5, for the argument 













A. The Proportionality Principle Approach 
The first approach is based on the application of the proportionality 
principle in the judicial review of rights claims. David Beatty has argued 
that the employment of a proportionality analysis in the judicial review of 
fundamental constitutional rights is not only becoming universal in the 
jurisprudence of constitutional democracies, but is an essential component 
of a thick conception of the rule of law.22  
The proportionality principle is the justification analysis employed by 
the court in determining whether a violation of a right may nonetheless be 
justified in terms that are consistent with the values of a free and 
democratic society, and will be easily recognized by most readers. In its 
general form, the proportionality model requires the court to make a 
careful evaluation of the relationship among: (i) the objective of the 
impugned government action; (ii) the means selected by the government to 
achieve that objective, in the form of a prescribed law; and (iii) the effects 
of such law, both in terms of the extent to which it may be expected to 
realize its stated objective, and the nature and extent of the harm it will 
inflict on the claimant class and the constitutional system itself.23 The first 
branch of the analytical approach requires not only an assessment of the 
importance of the government objective but also its legitimacy, in terms 
that are consistent with the underlying values of democracy. In other 
words, the government must establish not only that the objective is 
compelling or significantly important, but also that it comports with the 
values and principles of a free and democratic society. 
In the second element of the test, the government must prove that there 
is a rational connection between the impugned measures and their stated 
objective, such that it would be more likely than not that the selected 
means would indeed lead to a realization of the objective. Moreover, in 
assessing rationality, the test requires the court to determine whether the 
law in question is carefully tailored so as not to be over- or underinclusive, 
and whether there are alternative measures that could be adopted to 
achieve the same objective that would be less restrictive or harmful to the 
right in question (the so-called less restrictive alternative.)  
The third element of the test is the analysis of the proportionality 
between the harm that is to be caused through the admitted violation of the 
right, and the benefit that is to be derived from achieving the important 
 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 92–93, 98 (discussing the relationship to equality rights, which we will be examining in 
more detail below). 












governmental objective. The evaluation of both rationality and 
proportionality involves a detailed evidence-based inquiry into the facts, in 
which careful account is taken of the perspectives of both sides. The 
analysis of the effects on the claimant requires a meaningful examination 
of the precise manner in which the impugned law is said to violate the 
right in question and how the harm from that violation is experienced by 
the claimant. That in turn requires some understanding and appreciation of 
the substantive nature of the right itself and its philosophical foundations.24 
Only then can the court develop a meaningful understanding of the harm 
caused and the costs imposed by the violation for the purposes of 
considering whether it is proportionate to the putative benefits of 
achieving the objectives.  
Moreover, the assessment of proportionality is not to be an exercise in 
crude balancing of costs to the individual claimant, or even class of 
claimants, against the expected benefits to the broader society, a calculus 
in which the individual right will always be trumped by majoritarian 
considerations.25 In this respect, the proportionality model reflects the 
insight of Ronald Dworkin that if one is to take rights seriously, one has to 
recognize that the protection and enforcement of fundamental rights 
impose real costs upon society, but that those are costs that we ought to 
accept in a liberal constitutional democracy as being the necessary price of 
maintaining the very essence of our system of government.26 
As mentioned earlier, the proportionality principle as it is employed by 
most courts assumes a substantive conception of rights.27 Under this 
approach, when core individual constitutional rights are at issue, the 
 
 
 24. This point will be addressed in more detail below, but in the application of the strict scrutiny 
test by U.S. courts, this assertion is not always true.  
 25. On this point, see, in particular, RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 198–204 
(1977). 
 26. Id. at 204. It should be noted, however, that there are significant differences between the 
theory of judicial review advanced by Dworkin, what Beatty calls a ―moral theory‖ of judicial review, 
and that of the proportionality principle model articulated by Beatty. See BEATTY, supra note 19, at 
25–33, 173–74. 
 27. David Beatty does not make this point explicitly, and indeed he distinguishes the principle in 
some important respects from the moral theory of Dworkin. Nonetheless, in such courts as the 
Supreme Court of Canada, the Supreme Court of South Africa, and the European Court of Human 
Rights, to name just a few, the assessment of whether there has been a violation of a fundamental right 
that precedes the justification analysis provided by the proportionality principle is grounded in a 
substantive conception of rights. Indeed, the very nature of the analysis in applying the proportionality 
principle, and in particular the evidence-based consideration of the harm caused to the claimant by the 
violation, suggests very strongly that the principle itself assumes and is grounded in a substantive 
conception of rights. It is really only in the application of a variation of the principle in the U.S. 
Supreme Court‘s strict-scrutiny analysis that a substantive content-based understanding of the right in 













determination of whether the violation of the right can be justified will be 
made with reference to the substantive content of the right or freedom 
given effect in the constitutional provision in question, specifically in the 
proportionality stage of the analysis. Thus, in applying the proportionality 
principle as a model for assessing the legitimacy of judicial decisions, one 
would look at the extent to which the court has sufficiently weighed the 
substance and importance of the right in question and assessed the nature 
and extent of the harm caused by the violation of the right, both in the 
initial inquiry into whether the impugned law has violated the right, and 
later in assessing the proportionality of benefits to be achieved against the 
harm caused by the impugned law.  
This employment of a substantive conception of rights is potentially 
more controversial, at least in the United States, where there is greater 
debate over this issue in the competing theoretical justifications for 
judicial review and the most legitimate approach to constitutional 
interpretation.28 But at a sufficient level of generality and abstraction, there 
is nonetheless considerable agreement regarding the philosophical 
foundations of the fundamental individual rights enshrined in 
constitutions. To argue otherwise is really to reject the very idea of a 
―thick‖ rule of law as being a fundamental component of constitutional 
democracy.29 And while there may remain disagreements over the details, 
a doctrinal approach can be developed that nonetheless reflects a genuine 
effort to give effect to that broad understanding of the foundational 
constitutional values and core rights in a democracy. And as Beatty has 
argued, such a doctrine has developed in the form of the proportionality 
principle, which is increasingly reflected in the constitutional 
jurisprudence of liberal democracies all around the world.30 
As Beatty‘s study illustrates, the proportionality model is found in the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights; many of the 
constitutional courts or courts of final appeal in the countries of the 
European Union; the Supreme Courts of Canada, India, and Israel; the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa; as well as that of the Human Rights 
Committee and other international human rights bodies. It is, moreover, 
 
 
 28. For a good overview of the different approaches, see BEATTY, supra note 19, at 1–35. 
 29. David Dyzenhaus, Law As Justification: Etienne Mureinik’s Conception of Legal Culture, 14 
S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 11 (1998); David Dyzenhaus, Schmitt v. Dicey: Are States of Emergency 
Inside or Outside the Legal Order?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2005 (2006). On the rule of law more 
generally, and the distinction between thick and thin conceptions of the rule of law, see BRIAN Z. 
TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY (2004), particularly chapters 7 and 
8; and TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW (2010). 
 30. See BEATTY, supra note 19, at 33–35; 171–76; and 182–88. 












notwithstanding the debate in the United States over substantive versus 
process theories of rights, reflected in the strict scrutiny test applied by the 
United States Supreme Court in fundamental rights cases. Beatty even 
argues that it is to be found in some of the decisions of the Supreme Court 
of Japan.31  
I would suggest that the proportionality model provides a framework 
for assessing the legitimacy of court judgments regarding the enforcement 
of fundamental individual rights enshrined in most democratic 
constitutions, including that of Japan. Where the reasoning of a court in a 
particular decision departs markedly from the primary considerations in 
the proportionality model, or where the result cannot be reasonably 
explained in terms that are consistent with the considerations under the 
proportionality model, there is reason to doubt the legitimacy of the 
decision. Again, this does not presume that there is only one correct 
answer to a difficult constitutional question. There may be a range of 
conclusions that could all reasonably flow from a proper application of the 
proportionality model. But decisions falling outside of that spectrum will 
reflect a failure by the court to have sufficiently considered factors that are 
essential to enforcing fundamental constitutional rights. Such decisions 
will suggest that the court has failed to take the constitutional rights 
seriously. How this might be so is perhaps best illustrated through an 
examination of a concrete example, to which we will turn in the next Part. 
First, however, we look at the alternative of a process theory approach to 
legitimacy.  
B. A Process Theory Approach 
The basic argument that it is more meaningful and helpful to assess the 
legitimacy of judicial decision making rather than characterize courts as 
activist (or conservative) based on the conclusions they reach, is drawn 
from a book by Kermit Roosevelt, a constitutional scholar at the 
University of Pennsylvania. But in contrast to the proportionality principle 
approach to assessing legitimacy, which as we have seen, generally 
assumes a substantive conception of rights, Roosevelt employs a process 
theory approach to the assessment of legitimacy. This should appeal to 
Professor Matsui, who is himself a process theory scholar.32 Process 
 
 
 31. Id. at 68–71, 162 (relying, however, on cases involving freedom of religion).  
 32. Professor Matsui studied under John Hart Ely at Yale when doing his doctorate. For more on 
process theory itself, see ELY, supra note 19; for Matsui‘s own approach to constitutional law, see 













theory, as initially elaborated by John Hart Ely, suggests that the courts‘ 
approach to judicial review of constitutional rights cases ought not to be 
based on any substantive theory of the rights in question, or analysis of the 
substantive content of such rights. Rather the examination should be 
grounded in theories of democracy and separation of powers, and the 
extent to which the claimant class can assert its rights and claims through 
other avenues in the democratic process.33 According to Roosevelt, in his 
application of this approach, the issue of legitimacy is fundamentally a 
question of whether the court‘s judgment falls within an appropriate range 
of deference to the other branches of government. Thus, to determine 
whether the level of deference reflected in a judgment is appropriate or 
falls within the acceptable range, in the particular circumstances of the 
case and with respect to the specific constitutional questions in issue, one 
analyzes the decision within the framework of a number of criteria.34  
These factors are typical of a process theory understanding of rights 
enforcement, in that they make little reference to any philosophical 
explanation of the particular right in question. It is about the democratic 
process rather than the substantive content of particular rights. The first 
factor would be the relative institutional competencies implicated by the 
right in question and the issues in the case at hand. The theory suggests 
that the doctrine employed by the court should be more deferential where 
the question is one of assessing and balancing the societal costs and 
benefits of broad policy, or where the policy involves non-legal 
specialized expertise, but less deferential the more narrowly targeted the 
law and the less general the putative benefit will be, or where the issue is 
either more purely legal or more general in nature—the underlying 
assumption being that the political branches are likely more competent 
than courts at both aggregating the diverse and complex empirical data 
required for either broad societal or specialized non-legal analysis, and are 
likely better equipped to conduct the broad policy analysis itself.  
The second factor, the ―lessons of history,‖ would require a 
consideration of past inequities or failures of the political branches with 
respect to the issue and the claimant class in question. Thus, this factor 
would suggest a less deferential doctrine where the class of claimants has 
been the subject of legislative neglect or inequity in the past. This is 
reflected in the United States, where distinctions based on race are treated 
by the courts with the highest suspicion, in recognition of the history of 
 
 
 33.  See generally ELY, supra note 19. 
 34. See ROOSEVELT, supra note 6, at 43–44. 












systemic race-based discrimination. Similarly, the third factor, the ―defects 
of democracy,‖ is a classic process theory analysis of whether the class of 
rights claimants have adequate access to the levers of power within the 
democratic process or, conversely, represent a minority that is 
marginalized or disenfranchised within the democratic process and thus 
requires judicial protection.35 This is why, so the argument goes, 
discrimination against women in the United States is only subject to 
intermediate scrutiny (a less rigorous justification analysis than strict 
scrutiny), since women constitute a slim majority in the society and thus 
are arguably better positioned to assert their rights through the democratic 
process than a minority that comprises less than fifteen percent of the 
population. 
The fourth factor, the ―costs of error,‖ would assess how the costs of 
the court making a mistake in its judgment on the rights issue in question 
will manifest themselves depending on the level of deference selected. In 
addition to actually examining the relative direct cost of erring on one side 
or the other, this factor calls for consideration of the fact that if the highest 
court strikes down a law in error, that decision cannot be easily 
overturned. Conversely, the mistaken upholding of a law may be more 
easily corrected by the legislature in the future, so long as the defects of 
democracy and lessons of history do not suggest that the legislature is 
unlikely to do so.  
Finally, the last factor, ―rules vs. standards,‖ involves the question of 
whether the doctrine employed by the court in the case in question 
involved the use of rules or standards, and an assessment of which would 
be preferable in the context of the issues implicated.36 The suggestion is 
that in the development of doctrine to deal with certain kinds of rights, 
standards that allow for greater judicial discretion and flexibility in 
interpretation and application will be preferable to bright-line rules, which 
might constrain courts in unintended ways in the future. The argument is 
that in assessing the legitimacy of a court‘s decision, the doctrine 
developed or employed and the way in which that doctrine is applied in 
the court‘s reasoning can be analyzed to assess whether it reflects a 
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IV. THE LEGITIMACY OF JAPAN‘S SUPREME COURT DECISIONS  
This short response paper is not, of course, the place to begin a 
comprehensive analysis of the constitutional jurisprudence of the Supreme 
Court of Japan for the purposes of determining its legitimacy. But an 
illustration of how a particular decision might be assessed for legitimacy, 
with an explanation of how the judgment‘s reasoning may be flawed, may 
help start a discussion along those lines. A brief examination of one 
important and relatively recent case is provided here, and it will be 
suggested that the judgment illustrates the kind of Supreme Court decision 
that is of very doubtful legitimacy, whether analyzed from the perspective 
of either the proportionality principle model or the process theory 
approach. 
A. The Tokyo Metropolitan Government Case Examined 
The Tokyo Metropolitan Government case of January 26, 2005,37 
involved the claims of discrimination asserted by a Japanese-born Korean 
woman, a permanent resident of Japan, who was a local public employee 
within the Tokyo Metropolitan Government.38 Although she was a Korean 
national, her mother was Japanese, and like most second- and third-
generation Koreans in Japan, she had ―special permanent resident‖ status. 
This meant that she enjoyed certain privileges above and beyond other 
foreign residents, even those with permanent resident status.39 She was a 
health-care professional already employed by the Tokyo government, and 
 
 
 37. This examination draws in part from my analysis of the case in a different Article. See 
Martin, Glimmers of Hope, supra note 8. 
 38. There are over 600,000 Koreans in Japan, many of whom are descendants of Koreans who 
were forcibly brought to Japan during the period of Japan‘s colonial control of the Korean peninsula. 
KOREAN OVERSEAS INFO. SERVICE, KOREA-JAPAN WORKING SUMMIT IN SEOUL 3 (2006). There is 
considerable literature on the discriminatory treatment of Koreans in Japan. See, e.g., CHANGSOO LEE 
& GEORGE DE VOS, KOREANS IN JAPAN: ETHNIC CONFLICT AND ACCOMMODATION (1981); ONUMA 
YASUAKI, ZAINICHI KANKOKU-CHŌSENJIN NO KOKUSEKI TO JINKEN [THE NATIONALITY AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS OF KOREANS IN JAPAN] (2004) [hereinafter ONUMA, ZAINICHI KANKOKU-CHŌSENJIN]; 
Yasuaki Onuma, Interplay Between Human Rights Activities and Legal Standards of Human Rights: A 
Case Study on the Korean Minority in Japan, 25 CORNELL INT‘L L.J. 515 (1992) [hereinafter Onuma, 
A Case Study on the Korean Minority]. 
 39. Special Permanent Resident Status, or Tokubetsu Eijuken, is reserved for Korean and 
Taiwanese nationals who were Japanese nationals in 1946, or their descendents. With the signing of 
the San Francisco Treaty in 1946, former Taiwanese and Korean nationals who then had Japanese 
citizenship were stripped of their Japanese nationality. They were extended a special status, with 
unique rights relating to re-entry and deportation in particular, in 1965 and with periodic amendments 
to the immigration laws thereafter. See TETSUKA KAZUAKI, GAIKOKUJIN TO HŌ [FOREIGNERS AND THE 
LAW] 61–62, 81 (2005). 












she sought to take the exams that qualified employees for promotion to 
managerial level. She was twice denied on the grounds that only Japanese 
nationals were entitled to take the exams (the first time she was denied 
there was no formally promulgated policy, but merely an informal 
unwritten practice; by the following year, when she was again denied, the 
policy had been formalized, but still not in the form of a law or 
regulation).40 She sued the Tokyo government for violation of, among 
other things, Article 3 of the Labour Standards Law and Article 14 of the 
Constitution.  
Article 14(1) of the Constitution provides for the right to be treated as 
an equal and not to be discriminated against, specifically providing that: 
―All of the people are equal under the law and there shall be no 
discrimination in political, economic or social relations because of race, 
creed, sex, social status or family origin.‖41  
The phrase ―all of the people‖ is the accepted translation of subete 
kokumin in the context of Article 14, and it has been interpreted to include 
foreigners.42 The Supreme Court has developed an extremely relaxed 
doctrine for assessing whether discrimination by the government can be 
justified, which is commonly called the ―unreasonable discrimination 
test.‖43 The approach is essentially to skip any inquiry into the nature of 
the discrimination itself, or how precisely the impugned law violates the 
right, with reference to the prohibited grounds and the protected relations 
in the provision. There is no evidence-based examination of the nature of 
the harm that it has caused to the claimant. Rather, the inquiry moves 
directly to a justification analysis, or more specifically, whether the 
discrimination is ―reasonable.‖ The Supreme Court established in the first 
equality cases that, notwithstanding the unqualified language of Article 14, 
only discrimination that was ―unreasonable‖ or that lacked ―rationality‖ 
 
 
 40. As will be discussed more fully below, the ―policy‖ was never actually promulgated by 
ordinance or regulation duly passed by the Tokyo government, and, not having been prescribed by 
law, one would expect such a ―policy‖ to be shown very little deference in the justification analysis. 
 41. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 14, para. 1 (official translation from the 
Government Printing Office, available on the National Diet Library website at http://www.ndl.go.jp/ 
constitution/e/etc/c01.html#s2). 
 42. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 18, 1964, 18 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 
9, 579. Subete kokumin would normally be translated as ―all nationals,‖ and indeed there was 
considerable conflict between the American drafters and representatives of the Japanese government 
over the use of this language in the revision and translation process during the drafting of the 
Constitution. See MOORE, PARTNERS, supra note 1, at 130–31. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of 
Japan decided in the 1964 case that it included foreigners, and the accepted translation is ―all of the 
people.‖  
 43. See Martin, Glimmers of Hope, supra note 8, at 199–205 (providing an analysis of the 













(gorisei, which can be translated as either ―reasonableness‖ or 
―rationality‖) was prohibited by the Constitution.44 Assessing the 
―reasonableness‖ of any particular discriminatory law involves an 
assessment of whether there is a rational connection between the 
government objective and the means adopted for its achievement, without 
any inquiry into the relative importance of the objective itself, or whether 
the objective is consistent with the other constitutional values or indeed 
any of the norms and values of a democratic society.45 It is an assessment 
of the logic of the internal relationship between end and means, without 
any reference to external criteria whatsoever. 
In the Tokyo Metropolitan Government case, the Tokyo High Court 
departed from this relaxed doctrine. It granted the applicant partial relief 
on the grounds that she enjoyed the protection of Article 14, that the 
policy of the Tokyo government was discriminatory in the context of 
economic relations and on the basis of social status, and that the impugned 
policy was overly broad and not the least restrictive means of achieving its 
stated objectives.46 The Supreme Court, however, granted the appeal and 
overturned the decision of the Tokyo High Court, thereby upholding the 
constitutionality of the policy of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. The 
result in and of itself might be seen by some as conservative, in that it was 
deferential to a government—albeit a prefectural government rather than 
the federal government—and ideologically it would seem to have reflected 
a very thin conception of individual rights protection. But it is through an 
examination of the reasoning of the Court that we can assess the extent to 
which the judgment falls within the range of legitimate decisions in the 
context of the issues and circumstances of the case. We may also find 
direct evidence of the judges declining to take seriously the provisions of 
the Constitution as positive law requiring enforcement. We will begin by 
examining the case through the lens of the proportionality principle, 
following which we will assess it against the factors of legitimacy in the 
process theory approach. 
 
 
 44. See, e.g., Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. l4, 1973, 27 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ 
[KEISUHŪ] 3, 265 (the Patricide case) translated in LAWRENCE W. BEER & HIROSHI ITOH, THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN, 1970 THROUGH 1990, at 146 (1996). For a discussion of the 
test, see ASHIBE, KENPŌ [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW], supra note 10, at 125–27. 
 45. ASHIBE, KENPŌ [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW], supra note 10, at 125–27. 
 46. Kōtō Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] Nov. 26, 1997, 1639 TŌKYŌ KŌTŌ SAIBANSHO 
HANKETSU JIHŌ [KEIJI] 30. 












B. Legitimacy of the Judgment—The Proportionality Principle Approach 
It is apparent from the reasons of the Supreme Court that the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government had argued that the discriminatory policy was 
necessary to maintain the integrity and functioning of its so-called 
―integrated management appointment system.‖47 Under this horizontally 
integrated system, all employees who were promoted above a certain 
managerial rank would become theoretically eligible for all of the senior 
managerial positions throughout the government apparatus. Only a few of 
these managerial positions involved the exercise of what was called 
―public authority,‖ but the Supreme Court accepted the argument that, in 
its current structure, the system operated such that anyone promoted to this 
managerial level would also be eligible to work in one of the few posts 
involving the exercise of such ―public authority.‖  
The term ―public authority‖ had precise legal significance, flowing 
from Article 15 of the Constitution. Article 15 provides for the rights of 
suffrage and sovereignty of the people, and the Court reaffirmed prior 
interpretations of the provision as meaning that only Japanese nationals 
could hold office as local government employees with ―public authority.‖ 
Therefore, because the integrated management system operated in such a 
way that all managers above a certain rank were eligible for positions that 
exercised public authority, and given the necessity of restricting 
employees with public authority to Japanese nationals, the Court held that 
the Tokyo government‘s policy of excluding all foreign nationals from 
promotion to managerial status was reasonable.48 This applied to the case 
of the applicant too, even though she had sought to take specialized exams 
related only to her health profession and was seeking to work in a specific 
area that did not exercise such ―public authority.‖ Indeed, only a small 
percentage of all the management positions involved the exercise of public 
authority. 
The Article 15 sovereignty argument is highly questionable, but is 
beside the point for our purposes.49 Assuming it to be correct, the 
 
 
 47. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 26, 2005, 59 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
1, plurality opinion, at sec. 4. 
 48. Id. at sec. 4.  
 49. Article 15 provides:  
The people have the inalienable right to choose their public officials and to dismiss them. (2) 
All public officials are servants of the whole community and not of any group thereof. (3) 
Universal adult suffrage is guaranteed with regard to election of public officials. (4) In all 
elections, secrecy of the ballot shall not be violated. A voter shall not be answerable, publicly 













reasoning of the court in finding that the Tokyo government policy was 
―reasonable‖ still reflects the acute weakness of the unreasonable 
discrimination test as a means of giving effect to the right to equality. The 
ratio of the case may be found in paragraph 4(2) of the majority opinion, 
in which the Court held: 
It follows that where an ordinary local public body establishes such 
an integrated management appointment system and then takes a 
measure to allow only Japanese employees to be promoted to 
managerial posts, the ordinary local public body is deemed to 
distinguish between employees who are Japanese nationals and 
those who are foreign residents based on reasonable grounds, so it is 
appropriate to construe such measure not to be a violation of Article 
3 of the Labor Standards Law or Article 14, Para. 1 of the 
Constitution.50 
The Court merely accepted that it is within the discretion of a local public 
body (that is a municipal or prefectural government) ―to establish, based 
on its own judgment, an integrated management appointment system,‖51 
and its objectives required no further justification. There was thus no 
inquiry into the importance of having such a comprehensive system or 
what pressing interest was served by having everyone promoted to 
management level be eligible for later appointment to positions of ―public 
authority.‖ Indeed, the policy objective was never clearly articulated by 
the Court, far less its importance or the benefits of achieving it. There was 
no analysis as to whether or precisely how the policy of limiting 
promotion to Japanese nationals, or the feature of making all managers 
eligible for positions with ―public authority,‖ was rationally connected to 
the policy objective, even though this was the one element of the 
unreasonable discrimination test that the court was required to explore. 
There was no analysis of whether the objectives, whatever they might be, 
could be achieved through means that would be less discriminatory than 
was the policy of total exclusion. The Tokyo High Court, for instance, had 
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plain reading of this provision can give rise to a principle that limits all exercise of ―public authority‖ 
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 50. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 26, 2005, 59 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
1, plurality opinion, at sec. 4(2). 
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reasoned that a narrower policy could be fashioned, whereby foreigners 
could be promoted to managerial rank but restricted from transfer to 
positions wielding public authority.52 That argument was rejected in the 
majority decision of the Supreme Court without any analysis as to how 
such an adjustment of the personnel procedures would impair the 
achievement of the overall policy objectives of the system. 
Indeed, the Court did not discuss the effects of the policy in any way, 
in terms of either its positive or negative impact. Most significantly, in 
keeping with the ―unreasonable discrimination test,‖ it did not evaluate the 
precise nature of the discrimination or the harm that it might cause to the 
claimant. There was no examination of what stereotypes might underlie 
the policy of excluding foreigners, the power imbalances it might 
perpetuate, or the extent to which it might deeply harm the dignity, in both 
the objective and subjective sense of the term, of all foreigners resident in 
Japan.53 As is typical in the Court‘s application of the ―unreasonable 
discrimination test,‖ the issue of discrimination and the violation of the 
right were collapsed into and lost within the justification argument. The 
decision, boiled down to its essentials, was simply this: (1) only Japanese 
nationals may fulfill positions of public authority; (2) under the integrated 
management system of the government, all those promoted to 
management rank may fill positions of public authority; and (3) therefore, 
the policy of excluding foreigners from promotion to management rank is 
reasonable.54  
Moreover, when one goes on to examine the concurring opinions of 
several of the other Justices, there is even further reason to query the 
legitimacy of the Court‘s approach to the issue of equality rights in this 
 
 
 52. Kōtō Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] Nov. 26, 1997, 1639 TŌKYŌ KŌTŌ SAIBANSHO 
HANKETSU JIHŌ [KEIJI] 30. 
 53. In the context of equality rights, the dignity of the person has both an objective and a 
subjective component, with the objective relating to the inherent value of every human being in 
Kantian terms, and the subjective relating to the individual‘s own sense of self-esteem and self-worth. 
See Sophia R. Moreau, The Wrongs of Unequal Treatment, 54 U. TORONTO L.J. 291, 295–97 (2004). 
 54  While it was not raised in the judgment, it could be argued that the ease with which foreign 
nationals can naturalize, that is adopt Japanese nationality, ought to be a consideration in assessing the 
extent of the harm to the claimant. It has, in fact, become easier than it once was for zainichi 
kankokujin to naturalize under the Nationality Act. But, as several judges of the Supreme Court of 
Canada held in a case considering similar issues, even where naturalization is available, there are 
important reasons why persons within a particular cultural community within a country may not want 
to naturalize, including the possible requirement to abandon one‘s original nationality. There is the 
argument that nationality, like religion, while it may not be permanent or immutable, is closely tied to 
one‘s sense of identity, and one should not be required to abandon it as the price of obtaining access to 
important state institutions, or the enjoyment of other rights and entitlements. See Lavoie v. Canada, 













case. Justices Ueda, Kanatani, and Fujita, in three separate opinions, each 
addressed the question of whether the Constitution ―guarantees foreign 
nationals the right to take office as government employees,‖ as though this 
was indeed the operative constitutional question in the case.55 None of 
them addressed the question that was in fact before the Court, the question 
that related to an actual provision in the Constitution, which was whether a 
public policy that treats foreigners differently by denying them promotion 
within the prefectural government service constitutes discrimination on the 
basis of nationality and national origin, and unjustifiably violates the right 
to be treated as an equal under the law in, among other things, economic 
relations.56  
Justice Fujita went so far as to suggest that the right to equality is not 
an ―inherent right‖ in any event, writing that ―[f]reedom of choice in 
employment, the principle of equality, etc. are rights to freedom, which are 
originally intended to only protect inherent rights and freedoms from 
restrictions, rather than creating rights and freedoms that are not 
inherent.‖57 This reflects an understanding of Article 14 as being a purely 
procedural right, designed merely to govern the operation and enjoyment 
of other substantive rights enshrined in the Constitution. This 
interpretation is entirely at odds with the fact that Article 14 was intended 
to be, and has been clearly interpreted as being, a substantive free-standing 
right to be treated as an equal and not to be discriminated against.58 In any 
event, in the final analysis, all three Justices ultimately addressed the issue 
as one of government discretion, and whether the integrated management 
appointment system and the policy excluding foreigners went ―beyond the 
 
 
 55. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 26, 2005, 59 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
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1 (Fujita, J., concurring opinion, at sec. 2). 
 58. On the underlying intention, see MOORE, PARTNERS, supra note 1, at 130–31; on the 
interpretation of the provision, see generally ASHIBE, KENPŌ [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW], supra note 10, 
at 121–38. 












bounds of legally acceptable personnel policy.‖59 Here, then, is some 
cogent evidence of a constitutional provision not being taken seriously as 
positive law that requires enforcement by the Court, in corroboration of 
Professor Matsui‘s central claim. 
While the Court never explored the actual objectives of the policy, 
Justice Fujita in a sense put his finger on the very crux of the issue. In 
discussing the Tokyo High Court‘s consideration of less restrictive 
alternatives, Justice Fujita wrote that if such special personnel 
considerations were required of local governments in developing their 
policies (that is, making positions of public authority open to only a subset 
of all those promoted to senior management, as a less restrictive means of 
achieving the objectives), it would harm the flexibility of the personnel 
management systems.60 Thus, for him, the policy objective was apparently 
one of maximizing administrative flexibility, and the issue for him was 
one of balancing the fundamental right to equality on the one hand, and 
administrative efficiency and convenience on the other.61 Needless to say, 
administrative convenience won out. 
In short, both the reasoning and the result of this judgment are very 
difficult to reconcile with the operation of the proportionality principle 
model. The bureaucratic policy was not even prescribed by law, and its 
objective—which, putting it at its highest, has to be explained in terms of 
maintaining a system that maximized bureaucratic effectiveness, 
flexibility, and the breadth of experience among senior managers within 
the government—cannot be characterized as being so important as to 
justify the denial of a fundamental constitutional right. The rational 
connection was never really tested, and it is difficult to understand how 
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altering the system so as to permit the promotion of foreign nationals (who 
number about one percent of the population) to a subset of senior 
management positions not exercising ―public authority‖ would have 
undermined the overall objectives of the system in any meaningful way. 
The policy was thus overly exclusive, and there were far less restrictive 
alternatives available, which the Court refused to even analyze.  
Finally, the failure to discuss the nature of the harm to the claimant 
class not only meant that there was no appreciation of whether the benefits 
of the policy were proportionate to the injury caused, but it suggested a 
failure to really understand the nature of the right itself. The 
discrimination against this claimant, a member of the distinct zainichi 
kankokujin (Koreans in Japan) minority in Japan that has suffered a long 
history of prejudice, discrimination, and marginalization, merely served to 
again reinforce public stereotypes and reaffirm that Koreans in particular, 
and foreigners in general, are less deserving of the government‘s respect, 
concern, trust, and protection than everyone else in Japanese society. The 
policy injured the dignity not only of the claimant and the specific 
minority to which she belonged, but the judgment further undermined the 
normative power of the constitutional right itself.  
C. Legitimacy of the Judgment—The Process Theory Approach 
When examined from a process theory perspective, and drawing upon 
the five factors articulated by Roosevelt for assessing the legitimacy of 
judicial decisions, the judgment of the Supreme Court in the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government case falls outside of the range of legitimate 
deference to the government—and particularly a prefectural government at 
that.62 As indicated in the analysis of the judgment above, the deference 
shown by the Court was quite extreme. Indeed, the unreasonable 
discrimination test is by its very nature highly deferential, requiring only a 
rational connection between objective and means. There is no requirement 
to question the legitimacy or importance of the objective, and true to form, 
the Court here explicitly granted the prefectural government wide latitude 
to decide for itself how best to structure its personnel system, regardless of 
the specific policy objectives. 
 
 
 62. For those unfamiliar with the Japanese constitutional model, it should be emphasized that 
while Japan is technically a federal system, the Prefectures do not have independent law-making 
authority under constitutionally established heads of power as is the case with the states of the United 
States or the provinces of Canada. So the case for deference to a Prefectural government should be 
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Beginning with the first factor, the ―institutional competencies‖ 
criteria, it will be recalled that a court will be expected to tend toward 
greater deference where the political branch of government is likely to 
have a greater institutional competency than the court in weighing the 
competing policy interests. Generally, the broader the scope of the policy 
and the wider and more significant the societal interests that are at stake, 
or the more specialized the subject matter of the policy, the more likely it 
will be that the legislature would be better placed to determine the right 
balance, whereas the more narrow the policy objectives and the more 
localized the effects, and the less specialized or more purely legal the 
issues,the less deferential a court should be. In the circumstances of this 
case, therefore, one would expect the Court to tend significantly toward 
the less deferential end of the spectrum, since the impugned policy was 
narrowly targeted both in terms of the class of people who were to be 
directly burdened, and in terms of the very localized nature of the benefits 
to be gained. Maintaining a marginally more effective and flexible 
personnel administrative system within the government of one prefecture 
is hardly the stuff of broad societal interests and ought to command little 
deference from the courts. And there is no reason to believe that the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government had any particular competency in assessing the 
injury that its policy was likely to inflict on Koreans and indeed all other 
foreigners living in Japan. Given that it was initially implemented as an 
unwritten policy suggests that it was not the product of a process involving 
careful deliberation and analysis. 
Similarly, the second factor, the ―lessons of history,‖ and the third 
factor, the ―defects of democracy,‖ militate very strongly against any 
deference whatsoever in this case. As already noted, the applicant was part 
of a Korean-Japanese minority, a community of around 600,000 people, 
who have historically been the victims of prejudice and discrimination, 
both broadly within society and at the hands of various levels of 
government. Moreover, it is a community that was disenfranchised after 
World War II.63 More broadly, the employee represented all foreign 
permanent residents in Japan, who also constitute an insular and distinct 
minority of just less than one percent of the population that is 
disenfranchised, and who are subjected to well-documented systematic 
discrimination in Japan.64 It is precisely in this kind of case—in which a 
 
 
 63. For more on the treatment of Korean descendants in Japan, see, for example, LEE & DE VOS, 
supra note 38; ONUMA, ZAINICHI KANKOKU-CHŌSENJIN supra, note 38; Onuma, A Case Study on the 
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government agency is discriminating against an insular minority that has 
historically suffered from societal prejudice and official discrimination, 
and the claimant class is politically marginalized with no meaningful 
access to the normal levers of power within the democratic process—that 
courts are expected to show little deference to the offending government 
branch.  
The defects of democracy are further exacerbated in the circumstances 
of this case because the discriminatory policy was just that—an internal 
policy formulated by a prefectural government, rather than a law passed in 
the due course of the democratic process, or even a formal regulation duly 
promulgated under the delegated authority of any such law. Indeed, the 
policy had been no more than an informal practice not even committed to 
paper the first year the claimant was denied access to the exam.  
In considering the fourth factor, the ―costs of error,‖ here again the 
circumstances of the case suggest that there ought to have been no 
deference for the government position. If the Court erred by striking down 
the policy, the result would be, at most, an increased cost and 
administrative inconvenience to the Metropolitan Government, caused by 
the requirement that it more carefully tailor the integrated personnel 
system to permit the promotion of foreigners to nonpublic authority 
positions. While it is true that the prefectural government could not 
overrule the result, and so the error could not be easily corrected, the 
societal effects would have been trivial. On the other hand, the costs of 
error in the event that the Court wrongly upheld the policy would be not 
only the deprivation of the claimant‘s rights and the effective ending of her 
career, but far more importantly, the mistake would perpetuate prejudice 
and discrimination against Koreans and other foreigners within Japan and 
further weaken the right to equality generally under the Constitution. 
Moreover, given the political marginalization of the entire class of 
claimants—that is, in light of the defects of democracy and the lessons of 
history—there was no reasonable basis to believe that the Tokyo 
Metropolitan government would be likely any time soon to adjust the 
policy and effectively correct the error of the Court. The profound 
asymmetry in the costs of error here argued for no deference whatsoever. 
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Finally, with respect to the fifth factor, the ―standards versus rules‖ 
element, we may find some overlap between the proportionality principle 
model and the process theory approach. Recall that under this element in 
the process theory approach, we inquire into the nature of the doctrine that 
the Court applies and how likely it is to lead to deferential results. As we 
have discussed above, there is an increasingly universal application of 
some variant of the proportionality principle model in the adjudication of 
fundamental constitutional rights. And as we have already explored, the 
proportionality principle model does not involve the application of some 
bright-line rule. Thus, the issue here is not really the question of whether 
the Court applied a standard rather than a rule, but rather it is the nature of 
the standards that it applied, as compared to the standards suggested by the 
alternative approaches.  
The proportionality principle model is sophisticated, in that it both 
takes rights seriously and yet recognizes that rights are not absolute. While 
it certainly is not inherently deferential, it can and does lead to decisions 
that accept the justification of government violation of fundamental 
rights.65 In contrast, the unreasonable discrimination doctrine applied by 
the Supreme Court of Japan in all equality rights cases, regardless of the 
nature of the discrimination or the grounds upon which the impugned law 
makes distinctions, is a simplistic standard that is excessively deferential 
in virtually all circumstances. The criticism here is not the Court‘s reliance 
upon the concept of reasonableness—there are, after all, a number of 
doctrines that have been developed in various jurisdictions to assess and 
determine whether some government law or regulation can be justified as 
being ―reasonable.‖66 The problem with the test as it has been developed 
by the Supreme Court of Japan is its failure to incorporate any external 
criteria or exogenous factors whatsoever. Ignoring as it does any inquiry 
into the nature of the discrimination or the harm that it causes, and 
refusing to examine the importance or legitimacy of the legislative 
objective by reference to such external criteria as the values and norms 
inherent in a constitutional democracy, the test approaches a tautology. So 
long as the legislative means could be shown to rationally advance 
achievement of the objective, no matter what that may be, then the 
 
 
 65. Although, in the U.S., the application of strict scrutiny is considered to be generally fatal to 
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other jurisdictions. See, e.g., PETER HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA, at ch. 35 (4th ed. 
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discrimination it causes is said to be reasonable. The absurdity of the test 
is illustrated by recognizing that a law to implement a genocidal program, 
for the purposes of achieving the elimination of an identifiable group from 
the society, would theoretically not constitute unreasonable discrimination 
under a strict application of this analysis. It is for this reason that the 
Human Rights Committee under the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR),67 in its observations in response to the periodic 
reports submitted by Japan, has repeatedly criticized the analytical model 
employed by the Japanese courts in assessing discrimination as being 
inconsistent with Japan‘s obligations to enforce the right to equality under 
the ICCPR. In particular, it has expressed concern over ―the vagueness of 
the concept of ‗reasonable discrimination,‘ which, in the absence of 
objective criteria, is incompatible with article 26 of the Covenant.‖68 And 
that is further evidence of the doctrine‘s lack of legitimacy.69 
V. THE BIGGER PICTURE 
The argument advanced here is that a systematic analysis of the 
decisions made by the Japanese Supreme Court on questions of 
constitutional rights would likely reveal that a significant number can be 
viewed as lacking legitimacy, from either a process theory or substantive 
rights–based proportionality principle approach. Certainly most cases 
decided on the basis of the ―unreasonable discrimination test‖ would be 
suspect. But that does not mean, and I do not suggest, that all the decisions 
of the Supreme Court relating to fundamental constitutional rights are 
illegitimate. Indeed, even in the context of equality rights, the Court 
recently struck down a provision of the Nationality Act70 as being 
 
 
 67. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. Japan 
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unconstitutional and did so through an analysis that shared most of the 
features of the proportionality principle model.71 I have argued elsewhere 
that this and other evidence suggests that the Court is developing a new 
approach to equality rights cases, such that the illegitimate ―unreasonable 
discrimination test‖ may soon become a relic of the past.72  
It is precisely because the Court does hand down decisions that can be 
defended as being legitimate, in the sense that both the result and the 
reasoning are consistent with various approaches to constitutional 
interpretation and theories of judicial review, that in my view a more 
systematic inquiry into the legitimacy of the Court‘s judgments would be 
more meaningful than assertions of its conservatism as an institution. This 
is all the more so when one considers that the Supreme Court has shown 
itself to be both ―liberal‖ and ―activist,‖ which is to say nonconservative 
on two different axes, when dealing with nonconstitutional issues. For 
instance, Frank Upham and others have explored in considerable detail the 
manner in which the judiciary single-handedly created and enforced the 
right of women to equal treatment within the private-sector employment 
context.73 The Supreme Court played an important role in the process with 
its decision in the Nissan Motors case, holding that the corporation‘s 
policy requiring women to retire at an earlier age than men was unlawfully 
discriminatory.74 While the judgment was quite ―liberal‖ in both result and 
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reasoning, what is even more striking about this case (and other lower 
court decisions on women‘s rights at the time) is the manner in which the 
Court used the values of Article 14 of the Constitution for the purposes of 
engaging in a very creative, or what many would say ―activist,‖ 
interpretation of a provision of the Civil Code in order to create a legal 
basis for granting relief.75  
There are many such cases in which the Court has shown itself quite 
willing to be very creative in the interpretation of statutes and to reach 
results that could be characterized as being rather liberal.76 They provide 
further support for Professor Matsui‘s claim that one of the predominant 
reasons that the Supreme Court is so deferential and ―conservative‖ when 
it comes specifically to constitutional issues is that the Court, or at least 
the majority of judges on the Court at any given time in the past, have 
somehow viewed the Constitution as being more of a collection of moral 
or political principles than as positive law that commands obedience and 
judicial enforcement.77 And in addition to suggesting that Matsui‘s claim 
is an important contribution to the debate on these issues, I would suggest 
that an inquiry into the legitimacy of the judgments handed down by the 
Supreme Court would help to both verify the validity of that claim and 
provide the basis for a more meaningful criticism of the Court‘s 
jurisprudence. Moreover, I would argue that Matsui‘s central claim is 
really more relevant to the issue of legitimacy than it is to the question he 
purports to be answering, namely, ―Why is the Supreme Court so 
conservative?‖ If the question is reframed as, ―Are the constitutional 
decisions of the Supreme Court legitimate?‖ then the process of answering 
the question requires us to delve into exactly how the judges decide cases, 
how they understand the Constitution, and what doctrine they develop in 
the process of interpreting and enforcing its provisions. 
Some may respond that such an exploration of how the Court decides 
still does not get us any closer to understanding why the Court is so 
deferential to the government, or ideologically conservative, or minimalist 
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in its approach to constitutional issues—in a word, ―conservative,‖ in all 
senses of the word. And from that perspective, it will be argued that the 
other explanations, be they institutional, political, ideological, cultural, or 
a combination of all of these, are really more important to understanding 
why the Court decides the way that it does, regardless of whether or not 
one can characterize the manner in which it decides as being legitimate.  
There is no question that those are important and fruitful lines of 
inquiry, and indeed the insights they provide are not unrelated to the 
legitimacy issue. But Matsui‘s central claim, that the judges of the Court 
do not take the Constitution seriously as law, is itself grounded in the idea 
that the manner in which the judges understand the Constitution, and the 
legal principles they develop to both interpret and enforce it, are central to 
the explanation of why the Court is so ―conservative.‖ Moreover, implicit 
in that argument is the normative critique that the failure to sufficiently 
respect the Constitution as law is wrong, and that the resulting deference is 
both excessive and contrary to the very norms and principles enshrined in 
the Constitution. It is, at root, an argument aimed to change how the 
judges make their decisions. But I would argue that recasting the inquiry 
slightly would be more effective in achieving these concrete normative 
goals. A systematic analysis of how the Court makes its decisions, with a 
view to demonstrating that specific decisions of the Supreme Court are 
lacking in legitimacy when examined from the perspective of a number of 
different but well-established theories of constitutional interpretation, 
rights, and judicial review, is more likely to create pressure for change 
than broad assertions regarding the Court‘s character or ideology based on 
the end results of its decisions. And changes to doctrine can have an 
impact on how future courts will decide constitutional issues, holding out 
the promise of greater legitimacy in the Court‘s constitutional decision 
making over time.  
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